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Abstract
Can a trifle gain to suﬃciently many well-oﬀ justify imposing a much
larger sacrifice on the worst-oﬀ? We show that if one answers negatively to
such a question, one is forced to accept the maximin principle and give full
priority to the worst-oﬀ even when a trifle gain to the worst-oﬀ imposes
a substantial sacrifice on arbitrarily many well-oﬀ. If one dislikes this
consequence, one faces a real dilemma in choosing between the tyranny of
aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation.
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1 Introduction
The maximin principle of Rawls (1971) is widely considered implausible as a
principle of justice, because it implies that we give absolute priority to the
worst-oﬀ individual in all situations. Harsanyi (1975) provides the following ex-
ample in support of his rejection of the maximin principle: ‘For example, let us
assume that society would consist of a large number of individuals, of whom one
would be seriously retarded. Suppose that some extremely expensive treatment
were to become available, which could very slightly improve the retarded indi-
vidual’s condition, but at such high costs that this treatment could be financed
only if some of the most brilliant individuals were deprived of all higher educa-
tion. The diﬀerence principle would require that the retarded individual should
all the same receive this very expensive treatment at any event - no matter how
many people would have to be denied a higher education, and no matter how
∗Thanks to seminar participants at Queen Mary, University of London, Erwin Ooghe, and
Agnar Sandmo for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
†CNRS-CERSES, University René-Descartes (Paris), LSE (London) and IDEP (Marseille).
Email: marc.fleurbaey@univ-paris5.fr.
‡Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
and Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen). Email: bertil.tungodden@nhh.no.
1
strongly they would desire to obtain one.’ (p. 597). We may name this the
tyranny of non-aggregation. On the basis of this kind of argument, economists
and philosophers have been attracted by utilitarian and, more recently, “prior-
itarian” (i.e. generalized utilitarian) criteria (for a discussion of this literature,
see Tungodden, 2003). However, these approaches have very counterintuitive
implications. Scanlon (1998) provides an example: ‘Suppose that Jones has suf-
fered an accident in the transmitter room of a television station. Electrical
equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without turning oﬀ
the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A World Cup match is in progress, watched
by many people, and it will not be over for an hour. Jones’s injury will not
get any worse if we wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving
extremely painful electrical shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until
the match is over? Does the right thing to do depend on how many people are
watching — whether it is one million or five million or a hundred million? It
seems to me that we should not wait, no matter how many viewers there are...’
(p. 235). Both utilitarian and prioritarian reasoning would support the conclu-
sion that for a suﬃciently large number of viewers, the right thing to do would
be not to turn oﬀ the transmitter before the match is over. We may name this
the tyranny of aggregation.
In this paper, we consider the possibility of avoiding both the tyranny of
non-aggregation and the tyranny of aggregation. We provide an example of a
continuous social ordering function that does so. Our main result, however,
shows that all such examples violate a basic consistency requirement, and thus
that there is no attractive solution to this dilemma.
Section 2 provides the basic framework, and we present the results in Section
3 and some concluding remarks in Section 4. In the appendix, we present an
alternative formulation of our impossibility result.
2 Framework and basic axioms
Let Z++ be the set of positive integers, and also the set of potential individuals.
A particular population is N ⊂ Z++, N 6= ∅. Let N be the set of non-empty
subsets of Z++. An individual is i ∈ N , and we use the notation N−i = N \{i}.
Let |N | denote the cardinality of N.
An allocation is x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN+ , where xi is i’s utility. We assume
that utilities are fully interpersonally comparable, which implies that no social
orderings are excluded from the analysis because of informational constraints.
We apply the notation x−i = (xj)j∈N−i, x−M = (xi)i∈N\M . The subsets of
worst-oﬀ and best-oﬀ individuals are defined as follows.
W (x) =
½
i ∈ N | xi = min
j∈N
xj
¾
,
B(x) =
½
i ∈ N | xi = max
j∈N
x
¾
.
A preordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. An ordering is a
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complete preordering. A social preordering (resp., ordering) function R defines
a preordering (resp., ordering) RN over RN+ for every N .
We now list basic requirements that will be imposed on social (pre)ordering
functions. First, we have the standard Pareto principle.
Weak Pareto For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , if xi > yi for all i ∈ N, then
x PN y.
In the analysis, we also apply the stronger version of the Pareto principle
and a continuity requirement.
Strong Pareto For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N, then
x RN y; if in addition there is j ∈ N such that xj > yj, then x PN y.
Continuity For all N ∈ N , all x ∈ RN+ , the sets
©
y ∈ RN+ | y RN x
ª
and©
y ∈ RN+ | x RN y
ª
are closed.
We also introduce the following basic consistency requirement, that says that
removing someone who opposes an alternative does not make this alternative
more attractive.
Reinforcement For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , all i ∈ N, if yi > xi and x RN y,
then x−i RN−i y−i.
3 An impossibility theorem
The aim of the analysis is to study the possibility of avoiding the tyranny of
aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation. Formally speaking, this im-
plies that the social (pre)ordering function needs to satisfy the following two
conditions.
First, Minimal Aggregation states that if all individuals, except one, gain
suﬃciently, then it is tolerable to impose a loss on the remaining individual if
the loss is suﬃciently small.
Minimal Aggregation For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , all i ∈ N, there exist
α > β > 0 such that if
(i) yi − xi ≤ β;
(ii) for all j 6= i, xj − yj ≥ α,
then x RN y.
Second, Minimal Non-Aggregation states that if the worst-oﬀ gains, there
is a suﬃciently small loss that is tolerable for all the best-oﬀ, no matter how
numerous they are.
Minimal Non-Aggregation For all q, t ≥ 0, α > 0, there is 0 < β < α such
that for all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , all i ∈ N, if
(i) W (x) =W (y) = {i}, yi = q and xi − yi ≥ α;
(ii) for all j 6= i such that xj 6= yj , j ∈ B(x)∩B(y), yj = t and yj−xj ≤ β,
then x RN y.
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To appreciate the weakness of this condition, let us emphasize that the
admissible loss to the best-oﬀ may be arbitrarily small. Note also that this
quantity may depend on the levels of the worst-oﬀ’s and the best-oﬀ’s utility.
For instance, one could imagine that, for a given gain to the worst-oﬀ, the size
of the admissible loss to the best-oﬀ is decreasing in the worst-oﬀ’s utility and
increasing in the best-oﬀ’s utility.
The question we want to address is whether there exists a social (pre)ordering
function that satisfies both conditions. As a preliminary result, we observe that
there exist continuous and Paretian social ordering functions that avoid both
the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation.
Proposition 1 There exist social ordering functions that satisfy Strong Pareto,
Continuity, Minimal Aggregation, and Minimal Non-Aggregation.
Proof. The Geometric Gini social ordering functions satisfy all the condi-
tions. They are defined as follows: For any N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN+ , x RN y
iﬀ
nX
k=1
an−kx(k) ≥
nX
k=1
an−ky(k),
where x(k) is the kth component by increasing order, and a > 1.
However, it turns out that the Geometric Gini does not satisfy our con-
sistency requirement. To illustrate, consider the case where a = 2, with the
allocations x = (5, 5, 5), y = (3, 6, 10), z = (5, 5), w = (3, 10). In this case, the
Geometric Gini deems that x is better than y, whereas w is better than z. The
only diﬀerence between the comparison of z and w and x and y is that we have
removed a person who is better-oﬀ in y than in x. Because we consider x to be
better than y, Reinforcement therefore requires that we should also consider z
at least as good as w.
More generally, it turns out that it is not possible to combine Reinforce-
ment with our two minimal conditions, even if we relax the Pareto principle
and drop the requirements of continuity and completeness. To see this, let us
first establish the following lemma, which is also of some interest in itself as a
characterization of the strict preference part of the maximin criterion.
Lemma 1 If a social preordering function R satisfies Weak Pareto, Reinforce-
ment and Minimal Non-Aggregation, then for all N ∈ N and all x, y ∈ RN+ , if
mini xi > mini yi, then x PN y.
Proof. Consider any N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN+ such that mini xi > mini yi.
We will now prove that x PN y.
(1) If mini xi > maxi yi, then x PN y follows from Weak Pareto. Hence, in
the rest of the proof we assume that mini xi ≤ maxi yi, where i0 refers to some
person who has yi0 = mini yi.
(2) Define y∗, x∗, x∗∗, x∗∗∗ such that:
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y∗ > max
i
yi,
min
i
xi > x∗∗∗ > x∗∗ > x∗ > min
i
yi,
α2 = x∗∗ − x∗,
γ2 = x
∗∗∗ − x∗∗ ≤ β2,
where 0 < β2 < α2 are corresponding terms for the application of Minimal
Non-Aggregation at q = x∗ and t = x∗∗∗.
Let
0 < α1 <
9
10
γ2.
It then follows that x∗∗∗ > x∗∗ + γ210 + α1. Pick some 0 < β1 < α1 to satisfy
Minimal Non-Aggregation given α1 and for all q ∈ [x∗∗ + γ211 , x∗∗ +
γ2
10 ] and t ∈
[x∗∗+ γ210+α1, y
∗]. It then follows straightforwardly that there exist 0 < γ1 < β1
and m ∈ Z++ such that:
x∗∗∗ > y∗ −mγ1 > x∗∗ +
γ2
10
+ α1.
LetM ∈ N be such that |M | = m,M∩N = ∅, and letMk = {m(1), ...,m(k)}
denote the subset of M containing the first k members. Consider now the fol-
lowing allocations:
z1 = (y−i0|{z}
N−i0
, x∗∗ +
γ2
20| {z }
M1
),
z¯1 = (y∗, ..., y∗| {z }
N−i0
, x∗∗ +
γ2
10| {z }
M1
),
zˆ1 = (y∗ − γ1, ..., y∗ − γ1| {z }
N−i0
, x∗∗ +
γ2
10
+ α1| {z }
M1
).
By Weak Pareto,
z¯1 PN−i0∪M1 z1.
By Minimal Non-Aggregation,
zˆ1 RN−i0∪M1 z¯1
(because there is a worst-oﬀ that remains the worst-oﬀ and gains α1 in zˆ1
compared to z¯1 and all the people who lose are best-oﬀ in both alternatives and
lose less than β1). Hence, by transitivity,
zˆ1 PN−i0∪M1 z1.
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(3) Consider now the sequence z¯t, zˆt, zˆt for all t = 2, ...,m, defined as follows:
zt = (y−i0|{z}
N−i0
, x∗∗ +
γ2
20
, x∗∗ +
γ2
20
, ..., x∗∗ +
γ2
20| {z }
Mt
),
z¯t = (y∗ − (t− 1)γ1, ..., y∗ − (t− 1)γ1| {z }
N−i0
, zˆt−1m(1), ..., zˆ
t−1
m(t−1), x
∗∗ +
γ2
10 + t−1m| {z }
Mt
),
zˆt = (y∗ − tγ1, ..., y∗ − tγ1| {z }
N−i0
, z¯tm(1), ..., z¯
t
m(t−1), z¯
t
m(t) + α1| {z }
Mt
),
By Minimal Non-Aggregation, for all t = 2, ...,m,
zˆt RN−i0∪Mt z¯t.
Pick t ∈ {2, ...,m} . If zˆt−1 PN−i0∪Mt−1 zt−1, then by Reinforcement,
z¯t PN−i0∪Mt zt
(because z¯ti = zˆ
t−1
i and z
t
i = z
t−1
i , ∀i 6= m(t) and z¯tm(t) > ztm(t)). Hence, by
transitivity,
zˆt PN−i0∪Mt zt.
By (2), a recursive argument applies and therefore this holds true for all t =
2, ...,m. In particular, one has:
zˆm PN−i0∪Mm zm.
(4) Consider
z˜m = (x∗∗∗, ..., x∗∗∗| {z }
N−i0∪Mm
).
By Weak Pareto,
z˜m PN−i0∪Mm zˆm.
Hence, by (3) and transitivity,
z˜m PN−i0∪Mm zm.
(5) Consider:
w˜m = ( x∗|{z}
i0
, x∗∗∗, ..., x∗∗∗| {z }
N−i0∪Mm
),
wm = ( yi0|{z}
i0
, y−i0|{z}
N−i0
, x∗∗ +
γ2
20
, ..., x∗∗ +
γ2
20| {z }
Mm
).
By (4) and Reinforcement,
w˜m PN∪Mm wm
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(because w˜mi = z˜
m
i and w
m
i = z
m
i , ∀i 6= i0 and w˜mi0 > wmi0 ).
(6) Let:
19
20
γ2 < δ < γ2.
Recall that γ2 = x∗∗∗ − x∗∗. One then has,
x∗∗ < x∗∗∗ − δ < x∗∗ + γ2
20
.
Consider:
z∗ = ( x∗∗|{z}
i0
, x∗∗∗ − δ, ..., x∗∗∗ − δ| {z }
N−i0∪Mm
).
By Minimal Non-Aggregation,
z∗ RN∪Mm w˜m
(because there is a worst-oﬀ that remains the worst-oﬀ and gains α2 in z∗
compared to w˜m and all the people who lose are best-oﬀ in both alternatives
and lose less than β2). Hence, by (5) and transitivity,
z∗ RN∪Mm wm.
(7) By (6) and Reinforcement,
z∗−Mm R
N wm−Mm .
By Weak Pareto,
x PN z∗−Mm .
Hence, by transitivity,
x PN wm−Mm .
The result follows from the fact that wm−Mm = y.
We can now establish our main result.
Theorem 1 No social preordering function satisfies Weak Pareto, Reinforce-
ment, Minimal Non-Aggregation and Minimal Aggregation.
Proof. This directly follows from the fact that the maximin property ob-
tained in Lemma 1 is incompatible with Minimal Aggregation.
The theorem shows that it is not possible to avoid both the tyranny of
aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation in social choices. Note that
all four conditions are needed in order to establish the impossibility result,
as illustrated by General Indiﬀerence (violating Weak Pareto), Geometric Gini
(violating Reinforcement), Utilitarianism (violating Minimal Non-Aggregation),
and Maximin (violating Minimal Aggregation).1 A variant of the result, which
relies on another consistency condition (Replication Invariance) and a slightly
stronger version of Minimal Non-Aggregation, is presented in the appendix.
1The examples are defined as follows, where the quantifiers “For all N ∈ N and all x, y ∈
RN+ ” apply to each of them. General Indiﬀerence: x IN y. Utilitarianism: x RN y iﬀP
i xi ≥
P
i yi. Maximin: x R
N y iﬀ mini xi ≥ mini yi.
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4 Concluding remarks
The main result of this paper implies that there is a real dilemma in social
choices. No consistent criterion avoids both the tyranny of aggregation and
the tyranny of non-aggregation. Given that we find both the tyranny of ag-
gregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation to be disturbing, we believe that
one should be cautious when criticizing maximin, (generalized) utilitarianism
or any other social ordering on the basis of how they perform in extreme cases.
The assessment of the various possible social ordering functions should be more
comprehensive and, maybe, more focused on cases that are directly relevant to
actual policy issues.
Appendix
There is a variant of the impossibility result where Reinforcement is replaced by
the requirement that the preordering is invariant to the scaling of the population.
Let kN denote a k-replica ofN , and kx the corresponding replica of an allocation
x.
Replication Invariance For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , all k ∈ Z++, x RN y
iﬀ kx RkN ky.
We first note that there exist social ordering functions that satisfy Replica-
tion Invariance in combination with the other three conditions of our theorem.
Proposition 2 There exist social ordering functions that satisfy Strong Pareto,
Replication Invariance, Minimal Aggregation, and Minimal Non-Aggregation.
Proof. Let x¯ = 1|N |
P
i∈N xi. Restricted Maximin, defined below, satisfies
all the conditions: For all N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN+ , x R y iﬀ mini xi + x¯ ≥
mini yi + y¯.
However, it turns out that the impossibility reemerges if we slightly strengthen
Minimal Non-Aggregation. The strengthened version allows for the possibility
that there may be more than one worst-oﬀ person in y, which implies that the
worst-oﬀ person in y may no longer be the worst-oﬀ person in x. However, it is
still required that it is not among the best-oﬀ in x.
Minimal Non-Aggregation* For all q, t ≥ 0, α > 0, there is 0 < β < α such
that for all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ RN+ , all i ∈ N, if
(i) i ∈W (y) \B(x), yi = q and xi − yi ≥ α;
(ii) for all j 6= i such that xj 6= yj , j ∈ B(x)∩B(y), yj = t and yj−xj ≤ β,
then x R(RN ) y.
We can now establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If a social preordering function R satisfies Weak Pareto, Replication
Invariance and Minimal Non-Aggregation∗, then for all N ∈ N and all x, y ∈
RN+ , if mini xi > mini yi, then x PN y.
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Proof. Consider any N ∈ N and x, y ∈ RN+ such that mini xi > mini yi.
We will now prove that x PN y.
(1) If mini xi > maxi yi, then x PN y follows from Weak Pareto. Hence,
in the rest of the proof, we assume that mini xi ≤ maxi yi, with i0 referring to
some person who has yi0 = mini yi.
(2) Choose x∗, x∗∗, y∗ such that:
min
i
xi > x∗∗ > x∗ > min
i
yi,
and y∗ > maxi yi. Define α = x∗∗ − x∗ and let β be the corresponding term for
Minimal Non-Aggregation∗ at q = x∗ and t ∈ [x∗∗, y∗]. Let 0 < γ < β and m ∈
Z++ be such that:
min
i
xi > y∗ −mγ > x∗∗.
Finally, define the allocations z0, z1, ..., zm for the replicated population mN
as follows:
z0 = (x∗, ..., x∗| {z }
m{i0}
, y∗, ..., y∗| {z }
m(N−i0)
),
z1 = (x∗∗, x∗, ..., x∗| {z }
m{i0}
, y∗ − γ, ..., y∗ − γ| {z }
m(N−i0)
),
z2 = (x∗∗, x∗∗, x∗, ..., x∗| {z }
m{i0}
, y∗ − 2γ, ..., y∗ − 2γ| {z }
m(N−i0)
),
...
zm = (x∗∗, ..., x∗∗| {z }
m{i0}
, y∗ −mγ, ..., y∗ −mγ| {z }
m(N−i0)
).
By Minimal Non-Aggregation∗, for all t = 1, ...,m,
zt RmN zt−1
(because only the best-oﬀ people lose and they lose less than β while the one
who gains is worst-oﬀ in zt−1 and gains α). By transitivity,
zm RmN z0.
By Weak Pareto,
mx PmN zm and z0 PmN my.
By transitivity,
mx PmN my.
By Replication Invariance,
x PN y.
Hence, we have another version of our impossibility result.
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Theorem 2 No social preordering function R satisfies Weak Pareto, Replica-
tion Invariance, Minimal Non-Aggregation∗ and Minimal Aggregation.
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